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ABSTRACT 
 
JACOB R. THORNOCK: The Effects of Dividend Taxation on Short Selling 
(Under the direction of Edward Maydew) 
 
 
I examine the effects of dividend taxation on the primary parties involved in a short 
sale: the lender of the stock and the short seller.  Using a proprietary dataset of short 
lending fees and quantities, I find evidence that the supply of shortable shares decreases 
and lending fees increase around the dividend record date.  Moreover, I find greater 
increases in lending fees and decreases in loan supply for lenders that are sensitive to 
dividend taxation.  The loan fee increase and loan supply decrease are consistent with a 
tax-induced shift in the loan supply curve.  In addition, I examine effects on short sellers 
of the incomplete price drop on the ex-date.  I find a significant decrease in short volume 
before the ex-date followed by a significant increase after the ex-date.  This finding is 
consistent with short sellers delaying trading to avoid the cost of an incomplete price 
drop.  To my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the effects of dividend taxes in 
the domestic short selling market. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effects of dividend taxation on short selling around 
dividend dates.  The ability to sell securities short is important to the market because it 
helps improve the incorporation of negative information into stock prices (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1987) and helps to align stock prices with fundamental values (Dechow et al., 
2001).  It is therefore important to understand how constraints to short selling arise.  The 
purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which dividend taxes give rise to 
additional costs of short selling. 
There is little empirical evidence on the effects of taxation on short selling in the 
United States, likely because of the lack of data on investor tax characteristics and short 
selling volume. For this paper, I employ a proprietary dataset of short lending data, which 
includes loan costs and loan availability.  These data identify the tax preferences of the 
equity lenders who provide shares to short sellers, making it possible to directly examine 
the effects of taxation on stock lending.  In addition, I employ data on actual short sales 
volume for NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX firms, which allow me to examine how taxes 
directly affect short sellers’ trading relative to others’ trading.  
I examine two channels through which taxation can affect short selling. The first 
channel, which I call the ―loan effect,‖ is through the equity loan market.  Short sellers 
borrow shares of stock from the equity loan market, which is composed of lendable 
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shares held by large institutions and brokers.  A stock loan that is open over the dividend 
record date can have adverse tax consequences to the lender.  The dividend can lose 
preferential ―qualified dividend‖ tax rates, which would increase the tax rate from 15% to 
up to 38%.  In addition, the dividend no longer qualifies for the dividends received 
deduction (DRD) against corporate income.  Some lenders, such as pension funds, are 
tax-exempt and thus indifferent to these tax consequences, while others, such as retail 
brokerages, are sensitive to dividend taxes and in response can reduce loan supply.  For 
example, Fidelity suggests that it could ―recall dividend-paying shares‖ prior to the 
record date to avoid increasing dividend tax rates to the owners of the stock.
1
 The data 
used in this study identify the tax-sensitivity of each lender, which I exploit to examine 
how short selling costs vary with lenders’ exposure to dividend taxation.   
I examine the loan effect using an equilibrium framework that allows me to assess 
how taxes affect the demand and supply for stock loans.  Although the supply and 
demand curves are unobservable, I infer shifts in the curves by examining changes in 
both prices and quantities, following Cohen et al. (2008).  For example, if loan fees (i.e., 
loan prices) increase coincident with a decrease in loans available (i.e., loan quantities), 
then at least an inward shift in supply has occurred.  Using combinations of prices and 
quantities in the loan market, I predict that the loan effect of taxation is associated in an 
inward shift in the loan supply curve.    
I also examine a second channel through which taxes affect short sellers, which I 
call the ―reimbursement effect‖.  The reimbursement effect arises from the requirement 
by the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that traders reimburse to lenders the full amount of 
                                                          
1
 http://personal.fidelity.com/planning/tax/content/annualcredit.shtml.cvsr 
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the dividend on short positions held open over the dividend dates.  By meeting this 
requirement, short sellers ensure that the stock loan will be characterized as a loan rather 
than a stock sale, which would induce capital gains taxation.
2
   Prior research shows that 
stock prices do not drop by the full amount of the dividend on the ex-date.  Among other 
explanations, this finding has been attributed to taxation (e.g., Elton and Gruber, 1970; 
Graham et al., 2003).  The implication to the short sale market of an incomplete price 
drop is that the short seller’s cost (the reimbursed dividend) is greater than his gain (the 
price drop).  For example, if the price drop is only 80% of the dividend, short sellers lose 
20% of the dividend because they must reimburse 100% of the dividend to the equity 
lender (Dechow et al., 2001). 
The findings indicate that taxes affect short selling through both tax channels.  
Consistent with the loan effect, I find evidence of an inward shift in the supply curve in 
the shorting market around the dividend record date.   That is, I find that lending fees 
increase and loan quantities decrease around the dividend record date; an increase in 
price combined with a decrease in quantities is consistent with an inward shift in the loan 
supply curve.  Specifically, around the dividend dates, short lending fees increase by 27% 
more than the median rate before the dividend dates and by over 400% above the median 
rate at the 90
th
 percentile.  At the 90
th
 percentile, the cost to sell short is over 100 bp, 
which is considered ―on special‖ (i.e., expensive) for all investors and completely 
prohibitive for small investors.  
Having provided evidence consistent with an inward shift in the loan supply 
curve, I next examine whether taxes play a role in shifting the supply curve.  That is, I 
                                                          
2
 IRC §1058 (b)(2). 
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examine how shorting fees and quantities vary with the lender’s sensitivity to taxation.  
The evidence is consistent with taxation inducing the inward shift in supply: for tax-
sensitive lenders, lending fees increase and loan quantities significantly decrease, while 
for tax-neutral lenders, lending fees increase, but there is no change in lending quantities.  
These ―price-quantity pairs‖ suggest that dividend taxation is associated with an inward 
shift in loan supply.   
The results also support the reimbursement effect on short selling.  In the last days 
that the stock trades cum-dividend (i.e., the days leading up to the ex-dividend date), 
short volume decreases significantly, bottoming out on the cum-day (i.e., the last day the 
stock trades cum-dividend).  Following the cum-date, short volume significantly 
increases for three days and then falls back to normal levels.  Next, I examine whether the 
decrease in short volume before and increase in short volume after the cum-date is the 
result of the reimbursement effect and find evidence in support of the reimbursement 
effect.  Where dividend reimbursement is costly to short sellers, there is an eight percent 
total decrease in short volume over the five days before ex-date, followed a four percent 
increase following the ex-date.  This pattern is much smaller when dividend 
reimbursement is not costly for short sellers.  These findings are consistent with the 
reimbursement effect causing short sellers to delay taking a short position until after the 
stock trades without the dividend (i.e., on or after the ex-dividend date).   
This paper contributes to the literature in several respects.  To my knowledge, this 
is the first paper to provide empirical evidence on the effects of dividend taxes on short 
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selling in domestic equities.
3
  In their recent review of tax research in accounting, Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2009) suggest that examining ―whether and how tax policies affect 
investor and business decisions is a crucial task for academic research‖ (p. 38).  My 
findings suggest that taxation affects the behavior of short sellers, who appear to delay 
short positions to avoid the cost of the dividend, and the behavior of equity lenders, who 
appear to recall loan supply to avoid increased tax costs.  In addition, Chetty et al. (2007) 
suggest that to better understand the effects of taxes on asset prices, more work 
examining the effect of taxes on trading volume is needed (p. 21).  This study contributes 
by directly examining the effects of taxes on trading volume by a specific group of 
traders—short sellers.  
 
  
                                                          
3
 Two other papers, Arnold et al. (2005) and Christopherson et al. (2005) have documented the existence of 
shorting against the box, which is associated with capital gains taxation, and cross-border securities 
lending, which is associated with dividend taxation.  However neither of these effects is currently feasible 
within the United States.    
 
 
 
 
2. Background   
2.1 Mechanics of Short Selling and Equity Lending 
A short sale entails selling securities that are not owned by the seller.  The short 
seller establishes a short position by borrowing a stock and selling it in the open market.  
He then closes the position by buying the stock back at a later time, using the purchased 
shares to extinguish the initial loan of the stock.  By selling short, an investor can profit 
from a decrease in the stock price if the purchase price of the stock is less than the sale 
price.     
In general, a short sale requires a temporary loan of a security, which is sold to the 
purchaser of the stock.
4
  There are two main parties in an equity loan, the lender and the 
borrower.  Stock lenders are beneficial owners of securities who directly loan their shares 
to borrowers or loan their shares via intermediate agent lenders whose specialty is finding 
borrowers for the stock. Because third-party lenders are the agent representative for the 
beneficial owner and act on behalf of the owner, for expositional purposes, this paper will 
refer to both owners and intermediate lenders as simply ―lenders.‖   
Like other markets, the equity loan market clears at the price where supply equals 
demand (Cohen et al., 2008).  The supply of securities available for lending is provided 
by large institutions that have long-term long positions in equities.  Lenders, such as retail 
investors, mutual funds, pensions, endowments, foundations and insurance companies, 
                                                          
4
 The exception occurs when a stock is sold as part of a short sale, but delivery of the stock does not take 
place three days later.  This is commonly referred to as a naked short sale.   
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cover the cross-section of investors.
5
  The demand for securities loans is derived mostly 
for settlement issues, such as short selling and covering delivery failures. The lending fee 
is determined by supply and demand in the lending market; high demand or low supply 
increases the fee collected by the lender from the borrower (Kolasinski et al., 2009).   
The lender retains most of the rights associated with owning the original stock, 
including distributions such as interest and dividends.  If the stock loan is open over the 
dividend record date, the short seller is required by the IRC to repay the value of the 
dividend to the lender in order to classify the transfer of securities as a loan.   This 
repayment is called a ―substitute dividend.‖6  As part of the loan contract, the lender 
gives up the right to vote for securities on loan over voting record dates (Christofferson et 
al., 2007; Faulkner, 2008).  The voting rights of the security are transferred to the new 
owner (i.e., the purchaser of the stocks sold short).  A retail borrower is required by SEC 
Regulation T to meet initial margin requirements of 50% of transaction value.   The 
proceeds from the short sale are escrowed as part of the collateral requirement and the 
collateral is marked to market daily.  Lenders profit by investing the collateral in short-
term cash investments.   When the loan is closed, the borrower returns the shares and the 
lender returns the collateral less a fee called the rebate rate.  Practitioners refer to stocks 
with high fees (and low rebate rates) as being ―on special‖ (D’Avolio, 2002).7   
                                                          
5
 In general, retail investors loan their securities as part the margin agreement with their broker.  Retail 
investors generally do not know that their shares are on loan and do not receive compensation for loaning 
their stocks. 
6
 This reimbursement is often called a substitute dividend, a manufactured dividend or a payment in lieu of 
dividend.  These terms are used interchangeably in the text. 
7
 Typical lending fees, even for stocks on special, are small.  A $1MM stock loan (requiring 102% 
collateral) with specialness of 100 bp for seven calendar days is $198 = ($1.02MM)(0.01)(7/360).    
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It is important to note the timing and settlement of a stock loan transaction for 
each party.  For a transaction (long or short) on trade date t, settlement takes place on 
date t + 3.   The stock loan corresponds to the settlement date; that is, the loan for a short 
sale that trades on day t is settled on day t + 3.  The implication of delayed settlement for 
this study is that short-selling that occurs on the cum-dividend day corresponds to a stock 
loan on the dividend record date, which occurs three days later.  Thus, each party has a 
different event date for the same event: for short-sellers the event date is the cum-date, 
and for stock lenders the event date is the record date.   In the research design section 
below, I address how I account for the different event dates for each party. 
The loan of the stock to a third party, such as a short seller, is not taxable in the 
United States, so long as the loan is recallable and all distributions are reimbursed back to 
the lender.
8
  The Internal Revenue Code section 1058 affirms that an equity loan is a non-
taxable exchange of the stock for a securities loan contract.  Thus, the lender does not 
recognize a tax gain or loss on initiation of stock loan.  Fees earned from the loan, 
however, are taxable. In addition, lenders may face additional tax consequences for 
lending over the dividend dates and receiving a substitute dividend in lieu of the standard 
dividend.  This study focuses on two specific characteristics of the substitute dividend 
that can affect short sellers: the loan effect and the reimbursement effect, which are 
discussed in more detail below. 
2.2. Loan Effect  
                                                          
8
 Bris et al. (2007) report that in some countries (e.g., Chile, Finland), a stock loan is taxed  as a sale of the 
stock, which significantly deters securities lending in those countries.  
9 
 
Lending a security over the dividend record date can have two distinct adverse tax 
consequences.  First, lending over the record date can change the treatment of the 
dividend from qualified to unqualified.   The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) reduced the federal tax rate qualified dividends to 15% from 
38%.  However, substitute dividends are not taxed as qualified dividend income, but 
instead are taxed at ordinary income rates as high as 38%.
9
  Lenders are well aware of 
this potential tax cost of securities lending.  For example, Vanguard acts as the agent 
lender for retail owners of its mutual funds.  To protect the dividends received in the 
funds from additional taxation, Vanguard monitors securities lending of qualified 
dividends and states that it can ―restrict lending by a particular fund if it could have 
adverse tax consequences to the fund's shareholders.‖10   
The second possible adverse tax consequence associated with lending over the 
record date involves deduction of the dividend received from corporate income.  The 
DRD allows for a 70% deduction on dividends received from other corporations.  
Corporate lenders, such as corporations and insurance companies, subject to corporate 
taxation in the U.S. will face a heavier tax burden if their shares are lent over the record 
date because substitute dividends are not eligible for the DRD (Fabozzi, 2004).
11
   
These adverse tax consequences only apply to some lenders.
12
  Mutual funds and 
retail brokerages with clients whose holdings may be subject to additional taxation are 
sensitive to losing dividend qualification, and insurance companies and other 
                                                          
9 http://www.irs.gov/irb/2003-40_IRB/ar18.html; http://www.irs.gov/publications/p550/ch04.html#d0e12370 
10 
https://advisors.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/advisor/researchcommentary/news/article?File=IWE_NewsSecuritiesLe
nding; see also: http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-590/4590-16.pdf. 
11 Section 1.1058-1(d). This rule is intended to remove duplicate tax benefits that would arise if both the lender and the 
borrower claimed the DRD against corporate income. 
12 http://www.eseclending.com/about_securities/lending101.php 
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corporations are sensitive to losing the deduction for dividends received.   Lenders that 
face no tax consequences, such as foundations, pension funds, and endowments, should 
be indifferent to lending over the record date because they neither lose the DRD nor face 
increased dividend taxation.  I exploit this variation in tax-sensitivity in securities lenders 
in testing whether dividend taxes affect short sellers through the loan effect. 
2.3. Reimbursement Effect   
As mentioned above, when a security is on loan over the dividend record date, the 
short seller is required by the IRC § 1058 to reimburse the amount of the dividend to the 
lender.  By meeting this requirement, short sellers ensure that the stock loan is treated as 
a temporary transfer of stock, rather than a stock nosale that would induce capital gains 
taxation. The compensation the short seller receives for purchasing the stock cum-
dividend is the drop in price that occurs from the cum-date to the ex-date.  Thus, if the 
price drop is less than the amount of the dividend, the short seller will lose the difference 
because she must pay a full substitute dividend regardless of the incomplete drop in 
price.
13
   For example, in a frictionless market, if the dividend is one dollar, the price 
should drop by one dollar from the cum-dividend date to the ex-dividend date.  However, 
if the price drops by only eighty cents (because of taxation or other market frictions), the 
short seller loses twenty cents because he reimburses a full dollar. 
To summarize, taxes can be associated with short sales constraints in two ways.  
First, taxes on the owners who supply loans to short sellers can cause them to recall 
supply, which increases shorting fees.  Second, the tax code requires that short sellers 
                                                          
13
 Another tax cost facing short sellers is that short positions are always treated as short-term capital gains, 
regardless of how long the position has been open.   
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reimburse the dividend back to the lender.  The incomplete price drop is costly to short 
sellers who reimburse the lender the full amount of the dividend.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
3. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Taxation and Portfolio Choice Literature 
The effects of investor taxation on ex-dividend day asset prices and trading 
volume has been extensively researched.  It is well known that the price-drop-to-dividend 
ratio is less than one; however there is no consensus explanation for why this irregularity 
would occur. Several explanations for the incomplete price drop have emerged in the 
literature, including taxation (Elton and Gruber, 1970), transactions costs (Kalay, 1982), 
price discreteness (Bali and Hite, 1998), and bid-ask bounce (Frank and Jagannathan, 
1998).  The underlying theme among all of these explanations is trading frictions, in the 
form of taxation, transaction costs or other frictions,  that arise around the dividend dates.  
These frictions reduce the ability of arbitrageurs to trade away excess returns and thus 
give rise to overpricing on the ex-date. 
Elton and Gruber (1970) suggest that ex-day price drop is a function of 
differential sensitivity to dividend and capital gains taxation.  In a frictionless market, 
they show that in equilibrium, ( , and thus 
Price-Drop Ratio     (1) 
where  is the price of the stock the day before it goes ex-dividend, and  is the 
price of the stock on the ex-date,  is the amount of the dividend and  and  are 
the capital gains and dividend tax rates, respectively.  Since that initial paper, dozens of 
13 
 
papers have documented an association between the incomplete price-drop and taxation 
(see Graham (2006) for a recent survey).   For example, Graham et al. (2003) find that the 
median price drop is only 75% of the amount of the dividend, which they attribute to 
dividend taxation.   
There is also a large literature on the effects of taxation on equity portfolio choice 
(Hanlon and Heitzman, 2009).  Researchers have examined the investor response to both 
dividend and capital gains taxation.  With regard to dividend taxation, studies find 
evidence that investors form clienteles based on their preference for dividend taxes.  For 
example, Graham and Kumar (2006) find evidence that high-tax rate investors own 
stocks with lower dividend yields. There is also evidence that international dividend 
withholding tax incentives influence the worldwide portfolio decisions of individual 
investors (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala, 2009).  
  With regard to capital gains taxation, there is evidence that capital gains taxation 
induces ―lock-in‖, in which investors delay stock sales to avoid higher short-term capital 
gains taxation (e.g., Blouin et al., 2003; Dai et al., 2008).  Others have found evidence 
that investors carry out inefficient tax trading and portfolio location with regard to capital 
gains (Barber and Odean, 2004) and that capital gains taxes affect the managers’ 
decisions to sell their stock (e.g., Jin and Kothari, 2008).    
At this point in the literature, it is really not a question of whether taxation affects 
portfolio allocation decisions, but rather where and by how much do taxes matter in 
investors’ decisions (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001).  The sheer number of papers 
14 
 
exploring the effects of taxes on investors’ equity portfolio decisions suggests that it is an 
open and important question. 
3.2 Short Selling Literature  
Short selling can be expensive in many ways.  In addition to transactions costs 
and broker fees, there are many legal and institutional constraints that prevent short 
selling.  Almazan et al. (2000) find that only about 30% of mutual funds are allowed by 
their charters to sell short and many countries (e.g., Finland, Spain and New Zealand) 
completely prohibit the practice or have tax regulations that make shorting impracticable 
(Bris et al., 2007; Charoenrook and Daouk, 2005).  Cultural norms in some institutions 
and countries also give rise to short sales constraints (Lamont, 2005; Nagel, 2005).   
With regard to how taxes affect short selling, there are two effects that have been 
documented: shorting against the box and cross-border securities lending, although 
neither of which is currently practicable in the United States.  Investors who wish to 
reduce their taxation can extend the holding period of the asset until it qualifies for 
favorable long-term capital gains rates (Shackelford and Verrecchia, 2002).  In a ―short 
sale against the box,‖ an investor avoids higher short-term capital gains taxation by 
taking a short hedge position against the same security that has an accumulated gain, 
thereby locking in the gain until the qualification period expires.  Brent et al. (1990) find 
evidence that short interest is lower in December than in other months, which is 
consistent with investors using shorting against the box as a tax-deferral strategy.  Arnold 
et al. (2004) find evidence that since shorting against the box is not based on private 
information, the remaining short selling will be more informative and thus have a greater 
15 
 
influence on prices.  However, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97) made shorting 
against the box an impractical strategy by removing its tax benefits.   
Several studies examine cross-border dividend tax arbitrage using securities 
lending, which entails moving shares to countries with reduced tax rates on dividends 
(McDonald, 2001; Christofferson et al., 2005).  For example, an investor in a high-tax 
country lends stocks to an investor in a low-tax country on the dividend record date.  The 
low tax investor then receives the dividend, which is taxed at lower rates in her country, 
and the two parties split the gains from the transaction.  This transaction is effective at 
reducing taxation across tax regimes, but not within the same tax regime.  The effect of 
taxes on domestic short selling and equity lending is not addressed in the literature. 
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
The equity loan market is composed of many lenders of stocks.  The most 
common types of lenders are institutions who have large investments with a long holding 
period.  These institutions have differential preferences for taxation.  The loan effect, as 
mentioned above, posits that lenders that face increased taxes if they receive substitute 
dividends (on stock they lent to short sellers) rather than actual dividends will reduce 
their loan supply to avoid tax costs.   I predict the increased tax costs on lenders around 
dividend dates will cause the quantity of lendable shares to decrease and lending fees to 
increase.   This discussion leads to the first set of hypotheses on the loan effect: 
H1a: The supply of lendable shares shifts downward around the dividend dates in 
response to unfavorable tax consequences to beneficial owners, and in response, lending 
fees will increase.  
16 
 
H1b:  The increase in lending fees and the decrease in loan supply are positively 
(negatively) related to the lender’s sensitivity to dividend taxation. 
Next, I consider the second avenue through which taxes can affect short sellers—
the reimbursement effect.  A trader who sells short on the cum-date and repurchases the 
shares on ex-date makes a profit if 
  (2) 
The short seller sells the stock cum-dividend and receives   and repays  back to 
the lender.  The short seller unwinds the position by purchasing the stock on the open 
market for  and returning it back to the lender and pays transaction costs of C.  
Rearranging equation (2) to match the PDR and ignoring transaction costs, a short 
position is profitable if 
.       (3) 
However, we know from prior research that, on average, PDR < 1.  For example, Graham 
et al. (2003) find a median PDR of 0.75 during 2001 and Zhang et al. (2008) find a 
median PDR of 0.75 in 2005.  For my sample, which covers the period 2005 - 2007, the 
median PDR is 0.79.  This finding suggests that for the median dollar of dividend paid, 
the real cost to the short seller is 21 cents.  This discussion leads to the second set of 
hypotheses on the reimbursement effect: 
H2a :  Short selling is reduced (increased) in the days leading up to (following) 
the cum-dividend date. 
17 
 
H2b:   The drop in short selling before and on the cum-dividend date is a function 
of the potential reimbursement cost.  
These predictions are similar to those in Michaely and Vila (1996), which posit that 
abnormal trading volume around the ex-date is decreasing in transaction costs. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
4. Data and Research Design 
4.1 Data and Variable Construction 
Prior research examining the effects of taxation on investor’s trading has 
difficulty isolating the tax-status of the trader (Shevlin, 2007).  Proprietary data have 
made it possible for some researchers to directly identify investor tax-status and more 
directly infer tax effects on portfolio decisions (e.g., Ivkovic et al., 2005; Sikes, 2009; 
Desai and Jin, 2009).  My data offer a similar advantage.  
This study uses a proprietary database of stock lending availability and lending 
fees from multiple lenders, such as retail brokerages, pensions, insurance companies, 
banks and mutual funds, over several years.  This database is comprised of lending 
activities for nine large lenders with varying sensitivity to dividend taxation on stock 
loans.
14
  I exploit this feature of the data to examine whether cross-sectional variation in 
dividend tax sensitivity is associated with variation in lending fees and loan supply.   
The dataset provides the average loan fee paid for a short position for each firm 
and day.  The loan fee for a given firm i on day t, SPECIALit, is calculated as the 
difference between the federal funds rate on day t and the average rebate rate on day t.  
Since every short sale has a different contract (and thus a different rebate rate), the rebate 
rate used in this study is weighted-average rate for all contracts for a given firm-day, 
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 Ideally, the data would allow for analyses of the same lender before and after the passing of JGTRRA in 
2003.  However, my proprietary dataset does not extend back to 2003; hence, I rely on cross-sectional tests 
in the research design. 
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following Gezcy et al. (2002).  For a subset of the sample, I observe the lending fee, 
SPECIAL, for each of the nine lenders.  I adjust the fee for each lender’s benchmark rate 
following Kolasinski et al. (2009).
15
   
The proprietary data also provide the total number of shares available for stock 
loans as well as the number of shares on loan each day for each lender.  Total shares 
available for firm i on day t, AVAILit, is the sum of shares available from all lenders 
scaled by total shares outstanding from CRSP.   Total shares on loan, QTYijt, is measured 
as the number of shares of stock i lent by lender j on day t divided by total shares 
outstanding.    
To examine the trading activities of short sellers, I collect short selling volume 
from each of the three exchanges.  Short volume for the NYSE is available via NYSE 
TAQ on WRDS; short volume for the AMEX and Nasdaq exchanges is available from 
the exchange websites.
16
  The short volume database covers all short transactions for 
firms on the NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX exchanges over the period January 2005 through 
May 2007.  The data are given at the transaction level; to arrive at a daily measure, I sum 
across all transactions for a given firm-day, following Diether et al. (2009b).   
The primary measure of short volume used in this study is relative short volume 
to total trading volume.  Relative short volume for a given firm i on day t, RELSSit, is 
calculated as the ratio of total short sale volume to total share volume.  As noted in 
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 More details about the dataset are provided in Kolasinski, Reed and Ringgenberg (2009), who use the 
data to map the loan supply curve in the equity lending market. 
16
 I thank Mike Drake for providing access to these data. 
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Diether et al. (2009a), RELSS is less skewed than other measures of short-selling 
activity.
17
 
The use of daily short volume data is an improvement over prior research.  Most 
of the prior research on short selling uses monthly short interest, which is a stock variable 
of the level of outstanding short positions.  Daily short volume is only recently publicly 
available, and it is only available for a limited time frame, 2005 - 2007.  The exchanges 
made these data available in compliance with SEC Regulation SHO requirements.
18
  
Following Geczy et al. (2002), I align equity lending dates with short selling 
dates.  Because trade settlement in the U.S. occurs after three days, short selling on day t 
requires a stock loan on day t + 3.  As a result, I match short selling on day t with lending 
fees and stock availability on day t + 3.  The timing of the dividend dates follows the 
same t + 3 pattern—for a given cum-dividend date t, the dividend record date generally 
occurs on day t + 3.
19
   In sum, cum-dividend day short selling corresponds to a stock 
loan on the dividend record date.   
Table 1 presents the criteria used to create the sample.  There are 7,871 quarterly 
dividend observations for common stocks with available short volume, loan supply and 
lending fees over the sample period 2005 – 2007.20  I examine quarterly dividends from 
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 RELSS is used in most studies that examine short volume, including Christophe et al. (2004), Daske et al. 
(2005), Boehmer et al. (2008), Diether et al. (2009a, 2009b), and Christensen et al. (2009). 
18
 The short selling data do have some drawbacks.  First, the data provides only short initiations, but not 
short coverings.   That is, the data do not show when the short position is closed by buying back the shares.  
Second, the short volume data does not identify the short seller: they may be institutions, retail investors or 
market makers shorting for liquidity reasons.  Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2008) observe short account 
types and find that 74% of short sales are initiated by institutions.  
19
 http://www.sec.gov/answers/dividen.htm 
20
 Following Deither et al. (2009a) and other papers, I include only common stocks (CRSP shrcd 10 or 11); 
I exclude distributions from ADRs, REITs, ETFs and LPs, which face different tax treatment for dividends 
and capital gains than the majority of the sample firms. 
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the CRSP distribution files because they are predictable and generally part of a 
committed dividend strategy of the firm (Dhaliwal and Li, 2007).
21
  I restrict the sample 
to observations with a three-day difference between the cum-dividend date and the record 
date to ensure that settlement of short volume on the cum-dividend date takes place 
dividend record date, which removes 600 record date observations.  I exclude 
observations with missing PDR, which removes 169 observations.  To remove the effects 
of dividend signaling, if the initial dividend of a firm occurs during the sample period, the 
observation is excluded (239 observations).  In addition, I delete 325 observations with 
missing control variables, which are defined below.  As indicated in Table 1, the final 
sample includes 6,538 quarterly dividends paid by 1,232 firms during 2005 – 2007. 
To examine the effect of a lender’s sensitivity to taxation, I employ a dataset that 
identifies the lender of the stock loan.  These data are subject to two additional criteria.  
First, I require non-missing values for at least 10 observations for each lender per firm-
event observation.  This criterion removes observations characterized by infrequent 
lending for a given lender.  Second, I remove small transactions, which I define as those 
of less than 20,000 shares, to mitigate the effect of small loans on SPECIAL.   As noted in 
Geczy et al. (2002), small transactions are made on a contract-by-contract basis and are 
not likely to be representative of the average daily lending cost for a given stock.  
The first hypothesis predicts that abnormal lending fees are positively associated 
with the sensitivity of the equity lender.  I exploit variation in the tax-sensitivity in 
lenders to assess whether the abnormal increase in lending rates is associated with 
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 CRSP distribution code 1232.  This excludes special dividends, which if they are sufficiently large, can 
have different tax consequences.   
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taxation.  I identify tax-sensitive equity lenders as those that would prefer to avoid 
lending over the record date to keep the preferential tax treatment of qualified dividends.  
The lending database has loan data for two lenders that are tax-sensitive, a retail 
brokerage house and a mutual fund.  For these lenders, an open stock loan over the 
dividend record date can significantly increase the rate at which the dividends are taxed.  
For these two lenders, I set an indicator variable, TAXSENS, equal to one.  The other 
seven lenders, which are broker/dealers that loan and borrow from hedge funds, banks, 
endowments and pension funds, are characterized as tax-insensitive and thus, for these 
lenders, TAXSENS = 0.    
H2 predicts that the decrease in short volume is particularly strong when short 
sellers face real costs of the cum-date trading position (i.e., when the price-drop ratio is 
less than one).  Accordingly, I set the indicator variable REIMBCOST equal to one when 
the PDRt-1 < 1 and zero otherwise.  I choose the lagged PDR as a proxy for the signal to 
short sellers that the price drop will be incomplete. In addition, I use the split-adjusted 
amount of the dividend, DIV, as a measure of the cost of reimbursement.  
The specifications below include several controls that have been shown to affect 
either the short lending fee or the amount of short trading volume.  D’Avolio (2002) and 
Duffie et al. (2002) show that loan supply is dominated by large, liquid stocks held by 
large institutions.  D’Avolio (2002) also shows that loans fees are higher for growth 
firms.   Diether et al. (2009a) document that Nasdaq firms have higher relative short 
volume than firms traded on other exchanges.  Put options provide an alternate route to 
short selling when lending fees are high (e.g., Brent et al., 1990).  As a result, I include 
controls for institutional ownership, IO, to control for loan supply, SIZE and NANALYST 
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are included to proxy for firm size and TURNOVER is included to proxy for share 
turnover and liquidity.  In addition, the specification includes MB, to capture to effects of 
growth firms and an indicator, NASDAQ, for firms traded on the Nasdaq.  Finally, the 
specification includes an indicator for option availability, OPTION.     
The controls are measured as follows.  DIV is the split-adjusted quarterly dividend 
amount from CRSP.  SIZE is the natural log of lagged market capitalization from CRSP.  
MB is market capitalization divided by total common equity.  IO is institutional holdings 
from Thompson Financial over the prior calendar quarter scaled by shares outstanding 
from CRSP.  NANALYST is the number of analysts following the firm in the prior quarter 
from I/B/E/S.  TURNOVER is the mean daily trading volume in the prior quarter divided 
by shares outstanding from CRSP.  NASDAQ is an indicator equal to one for firms traded 
on the Nasdaq.  OPTION is an indicator equal to one if the firm has publicly traded 
options in the prior quarter according to OptionMetrics. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics for the stock lending and short 
selling variables during the non-event period.  The average loan fee, SPECIAL, during the 
non-event period is 36 bp, with a median of 13 bp.  These values are similar to those in 
other papers that find that lending fees are low on average, with a high degree of 
skewness in the distribution of fees (e.g., D’Avolio, 2002; Reed, 2007; Diether and 
Werner, 2009).  The mean level of shares available for securities loans is 10 percent of 
shares outstanding.  The median loan length is 23 days, and the median loan value is 
$317,135 (unreported).
22
  Panel A of Table 1 reveals that about 20% of all trading 
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 By comparison, Diether and Werner (2009) find that median loan length is 6-8 days (depending on the 
sample) and the median loan size is $240,000. 
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volume is short volume, which is a similar level to that presented in other papers (e.g., 
Boehmer et al., 2008).   
Panel B of Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the firms in the sample.  
The median price-drop to dividend ratio (PDR) is 0.79, which implies that the price drop 
is incomplete on average.  The average dividend amount is 21 cents, and the 
(untabulated) dividend yield average is 0.6% of the cum-dividend day price.  Institutions 
on average hold about two-thirds of the shares outstanding.  Approximately ten analysts 
cover the firm during the prior quarter, and 62% of the firms in the sample have listed 
options.  Finally, about 80% of the observations in the sample are NYSE and AMEX 
firms and the remaining 20% trade on the Nasdaq.   
Pair-wise correlations are presented in Panel C of Table 2.  Relative short volume, 
RELSS, is strongly negatively associated with the size of the firm (  = -0.39), the number 
of analysts following the firm (  = -0.27), and options listing (  = -0.14).  These 
correlations suggest that relative short volume is less for large, visible firms and that 
some investors are substituting options trading for shorting.  The cost to sell short, 
SPECIAL, is positively associated with short selling volume (  = 0.19).
23
  The 
correlations also suggest that smaller firms (SIZE,  = -0.39) that are less visible 
(NANALYST,  = -0.32) and that turnover frequently (TURNOVER,  = 0.15) are more 
costly to sell short. Finally, the loan supply available to short sellers, AVAIL, is strongly 
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 Untabulated analysis reveals a concave relation between short volume and specialness: up to a certain 
point (about 100 bp), short selling is positively associated with specialness.  As the cost to short continues 
to increase above this point, the relation turns negative, which suggests that at this point, shorting 
constraints are binding.    
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associated with institutional ownership (  = 0.52), size (  = 0.20), turnover (  = 0.25), 
and analyst following (  = 0.16). 
4.2 Research Design 
I implement an event study research design in which the event is the dividend 
record date for stock lenders and the cum-dividend date for short sellers.  As mentioned 
above, once delayed settlement is accounted for, these two dates are equivalent. The first 
hypothesis predicts that the supply of lendable shares decreases and the cost of stock 
loans increases around the record date as tax-sensitive lenders respond to potential 
increased tax costs associated with lending over the record date.  Following Cohen et al. 
(2007) and Dai et al. (2008), I use an equilibrium framework to examine how taxation is 
associated with a shift in the loan supply curve.  That is, I examine combinations of 
changes in price and quantity to infer shifts in the supply and demand curves of the equity 
loan market. The event study specification as follows: 
 
 ,         (4) 
where TESTVAR is either the total quantity of shares available for lending, AVAIL, or the 
price of a stock loan, SPECIAL.  EVENT is an indicator equal to one on days  t = [-1, 0] 
relative to the record date, t = 0, and zero on during the estimation period,  t = [-15, -
5 5, 15].   
For H1a, the coefficient of interest in equation (4) is .  If < 0 when the test 
variable is AVAIL, then I conclude that the quantity available for short selling has 
decreased on the record date, conditional on the other control variables.  If  > 0 when 
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the test variable is SPECIAL, then I conclude that the lending fee has increased to levels 
that are significantly higher than normal.  The finding of price increases coupled with 
quantity decreases is consistent with a negative shift in the loan supply curve.   
Second, I examine whether the increase in lending fees is greater for tax-sensitive 
lenders, following hypothesis H1b.  H1b predicts that the shift in the loan supply curve 
around the record date is attributable to tax-sensitive lenders reducing supply and/or 
increasing loan fees.  I augment equation (4) with a variable that captures the tax-
sensitivity of the lender, TAXSENS, which is equal to one for tax-sensitive lenders (e.g., 
retail brokerages) and zero otherwise.  The specification is as follows: 
4 + 5 −1+ 6 −1+ 
,           (5)    
where TESTVAR is either SPECIAL or QTY and EVENT is an indicator equal to one on 
days  t = [-1, 0] relative to the record date, t = 0, and zero on during the estimation period,  
t = [-15, -5 5, 15].  When the test variable is SPECIAL,  > 0 would suggest that tax-
sensitive lenders charge an incrementally higher rate than other lenders on the record 
date.  When the test variable is QTY,  > 0 suggests that tax-sensitive lenders reduce 
loan supply of stock loans for short selling.  By examining changes in both prices and 
quantities, I can ascertain how the loan supply curve responds to taxation.   
The second hypothesis predicts that taxes affect short sellers through the 
reimbursement effect.  To test this prediction, I examine whether short volume decreases 
in the days during which the stock trades cum-dividend (i.e., the days leading up to and 
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including the cum-date) and increases after the stock trades without the dividend (i.e., on 
and after the ex-date).  The specification to test H2a is as follows: 
 
,         (6) 
where RELSS is the ratio of short volume to total volume, measured as a percentage.  
EVENT is either equal to one on days t = [-2, 0] relative to the cum-dividend date, t = 0, 
to capture trading in the last days during which the stock trades cum-dividend or equal to 
zero on days t = [1, 3] to capture short selling without the dividend.  EVENT is equal to 
zero during the estimation period, t = [-15, -5 5, 15] and set to missing for all other 
observations in the event period, t = [-5, +5]. 
For H2a, which predicts decreased short selling while the stock trades cum-
dividend and increased short selling after the stock goes ex-dividend, the coefficient of 
interest is .  If < 0 when the EVENT covers days t = [-2, 0], then I conclude that the 
short volume has significantly decreased leading up on the cum-date.  If  > 0 when the 
EVENT covers days t = [1, 3], then I conclude that the short volume has increased to 
levels that are significantly higher than normal. This pattern of decreasing short volume 
before and increasing short volume after the cum-dividend date is consistent with H2A 
and suggests that short sellers delay trading in response to incremental shorting costs, 
such as the costs associated with the loan effect.   
 Finally, I test whether the abnormal decrease (increase) in short volume before 
(after) the cum-date is a function of the reimbursement cost faced by short sellers.  To 
capture the effect of the costs, I augment the event-study approach of equation (6) with 
two measures of the reimbursement cost:  
28 
 
 
 
,   (7) 
where EVENT and control variables are as defined for equation (6) and COST 
 is the reimbursement cost of the substitute dividend.  
REIMBCOST is an indicator variable equal to one when the prior quarter price-drop was 
less than the dividend and zero otherwise and HIDIV is an indicator equal to one if the 
split-adjusted amount of the dividend is in the highest quartile of the sample.  I predict a 
negative relation between abnormal short selling and dividend reimbursement costs,  < 
0, before the cum-date and a positive relation between short volume and reimbursement 
costs after the cum-date,  > 0.  This pattern of decreasing short volume before and 
increasing short volume after suggests that short sellers delay trading in response to 
incremental shorting costs, consistent with H2b. 
 Following Dyreng and Lindsay (2009), I implement robust regression in all 
analyses to mitigate the influence of outliers.
24
 Standard errors are clustered by firm to 
control for within-firm residual dependence.  Prior research has shown that short selling 
and lending fees are different across industries (e.g., tech stocks) and across time; hence, 
all specifications include industry fixed effects based on two-digit SIC codes and year-
quarter fixed effects.
 25
  In addition, I include control variables as defined above to 
control for systematic differences in short selling volume and fees. 
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 Robust regression mitigates the influence of outliers using iterated re-weighted least squares to reduce 
weights assigned to extreme observations.  In some cases, extreme observations receive a weight of zero.  I 
use this approach to mitigate the influence of outliers because it is less arbitrary than other methods such as 
winsorization or truncation.  In general, the results are similar if I control for outliers using truncation or 
removing observations with high Cook’s D values.  
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 The results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. 
 
 
 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Tests of Loan Effect (H1) 
Table 3, Panels A and B presents results from event tests of abnormal lending fees 
and abnormal loan supply around the dividend  record date.   In tests of abnormal lending 
fees, the coefficient estimate on the event indicator, EVENT, is 0.032 (t-stat = 19.11), 
which suggests that lending fees charged to short sellers on stock loans significantly 
increased.  There is also a significant decline in loan supply around the record date, as 
shown by the coefficient estimate on EVENT of -0.004 (t-stat = -21.70).  The results hold 
after controlling for other determinants of loan supply and lending fees, such as size, 
growth, dividends, institutional holdings, visibility and liquidity.   The price-quantity 
relation of decreasing loan quantity coupled with increasing loan fees suggests that the 
supply curve in the equity loan market shifts downward around the dividend record date. 
The second part of H1 predicts that the shift in the loan supply curve shown above 
is a function of lender sensitivity to dividend taxation.  Table 4 presents the results of 
estimating equation (5), which tests H1b.  The results support the prediction that the 
negative shift in the supply curve is associated with lenders’ sensitivity to the increased 
costs of dividend taxation.  Specifically, in model (2), the coefficient on 
EVENT*TAXSENS is 0.01 (t = 3.21), which suggests lending fees around the record date 
are higher for tax-sensitive lenders than for tax-neutral lenders.  In addition, in model (4), 
the coefficient on EVENT*TAXSENS is -0.092 (t = -5.81), which suggests lending 
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quantities around the record date are lower for tax-sensitive lenders than for tax-neutral 
lenders.  The increase in loan fees coupled with the decrease in loan quantities for tax-
sensitive lender suggests that that dividend taxes on equity lenders is associated with a 
downward shift in the loan supply curve, which makes short selling more expensive 
around the dividend dates.   
Figure 1 plots the abnormal lending fee on days t – 5 through t + 5 surrounding 
the dividend record date, after controlling for other determinates of lending fees.  The 
results in the figure support the predictions in H1.  Specifically, SPECIAL is at normal 
levels in the days leading up to the record date, followed by an upward spike in days t – 1 
to t + 1 and a drop-off to normal after day t + 1.
26
  The results in the second panel show 
that when the sample is split into tax-sensitive and tax-neutral subsamples, the spike 
much greater for tax-sensitive lenders.  Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4, as well as 
the results in Figure 1, support the loan effect on short selling. 
At this point, I discuss the economic significance of the increase in lending fees.  
The results from Table 3 suggest an average conditional increase in lending fees from 40 
bp to about 44 bp.  This amount is statistically significant, but economically trivial.  
However, these results are an estimate of the conditional mean.  Higher conditional 
quantiles provide a better approximation of the economic significance.  Untabulated 
results of quantile regression at the 90% percentile reveal an event-day increase in 
lending fees from 40 bp to 112 bp, which is much more economically meaningful.  At 
this level of lending fees, the stock is considered ―on special‖, as it is expensive to short.  
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 To reiterate, for stock lending, the spike occurs on the record date, which is the date on which settlement 
for cum-date short selling takes place.   
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Perhaps more importantly, stocks with lending fees this high are nearly impossible to 
borrow for borrowers that are not well-connected, such as small hedge funds and small 
institutions, and completely impossible to borrow for retail investors (Fabozzi, 2004; 
Lamont, 2005; Reed, 2007).   Thus, the tax-induced increase in lending fees shown in 
Tables 3 and 4 is both statistically and economically significant. 
5.2 Tests of Reimbursement Effect (H2) 
Moving to H2, I examine whether short volume is abnormally low in the days 
leading up to the cum-dividend date and abnormally high in the days following the cum-
date.  Table 5 presents the results of the event study analysis.  It shows that on average, 
short selling declines below normal levels on the days before the cum-date; the 
coefficient estimate on the EVENT indicator is -0.352 (t = -5.99).  Panel B shows that 
after the cum-dividend date, there is a spike in short selling volume; the coefficient on the 
EVENT indicator is 0.201, which is statistically significant at the one percent level (t = 
3.94).  The decrease in short selling  before the cum-date followed by the increase in 
shorting volume after the cum-date suggests that short sellers trade as if they are trying to 
avoid the dividend.  The next tests examine whether they appear to do so in response to 
the reimbursement effect.     
Tables 6 and 7 examine the hypothesis that the reimbursement effect contributes 
to the decline in short volume before the ex-date and increase in short volume after the 
ex-date.  In table 6, the proxy for costly dividend reimbursement, REIMBCOST, is 
negative and marginally significant during the event-period (  = -0.223, t = -1.97).  
Moreover, the total coefficient (i.e., ) is negative and statistically significant (p-
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value = 0.000).    The results are weaker, but still significant, for the days following cum-
date: the interaction coefficient on EVENT*REIMBCOST is insignificant and the total 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level.   
Figure 2 presents the average relative short volume for the dates around the ex-
dividend date.  The figure shows a pattern of decreasing short volume before and 
increasing short volume after the ex-date.  In untabulated results, days t = [-2, 0] are 
significantly negative at the 5% level, while days t = [+2, +3] are significantly positive at 
the 5% level.
27
  These findings suggest that that short sellers delay trading until after the 
stock trades without the dividend. 
The second panel of Figure 2 examines short volume around the cum-date, 
splitting on REIMBCOST.  The figure shows that when short sellers face a potential 
reimbursement cost (i.e., REIMBCOST = 1), short volume decreases even further before 
the ex-date and spikes much higher following the ex-date.  In statistical terms, when short 
sellers do not face a potential cost of reimbursing the dividend (i.e., REIMBCOST=0), the 
decrease in short volume before and increase in short volume after is not significant at the 
5% level.  However, when short sellers do face a potential reimbursement effect, the 
change in RELSS is significantly negative before the cum-date and significantly positive 
after the cum-date.  These results support H2 that short trading is affected by the 
reimbursement effect. 
In Table 7, the proxy for costly dividend reimbursement is an indicator for a high 
dividend amount, HIDIV.  The results in Table 7 suggest that short selling declines 
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 Although the spike in short volume occurs two days after the cum-date, the increase from day 0 to day 1 
is strongly significant.  That is, there is a statistical difference between then the fixed effects for days 0 and 
1, but no difference between any other two adjacent days’ fixed effects. 
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incrementally further in the days leading up to the event date as a result of the 
reimbursement effect.  Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction EVENT*HIDIV is 
negative and significant (  = -0.276, t = -2.16).  Moreover, an F-test of the significance 
of the total coefficient (i.e., ) shows that it is significantly negative (p-value = 
0.000).  The results for the days following the event date, however, are insignificant; the 
EVENT main effect is positive and significant, but the interaction with the reimbursement 
cost HIDIV is not significant. 
To assess economic magnitude, I sum the abnormal short volume coefficients 
presented in Figure 2.  When REIMBCOST=0, there is still a significant decline in short 
volume—the total decrease is 5% below normal levels.  When REIMBCOST=1, the 
decline is larger—the total decrease is 8% below normal levels, which is significantly 
below 0 and significantly below 5.9%.  Following the cum-date, there is no change in 
abnormal short volume without the reimbursement effect (i.e., REIMBCOST=0), but 
when the reimbursement effect is in place, the increase in short volume is 4.2% above 
normal levels, which is statistically significant (p = 0.036).
28
  Taken together, the results 
suggest that the reimbursement effect statistically and economically affects short selling.  
Short volume decreases in response to costly dividend reimbursement as measured by 
two different proxies and after controlling for several determinants of short selling 
activity.   
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 These figures are calculated as follows: the sum of the day coefficients from days t = [-5, -1] is -1.62% 
when REIMBCOST=1.  The mean value of RELSS is 21%.  Hence, the total decrease in short volume 
attributable to the reimbursement effect is thus -1.62%/21% = -7.7%. 
 
 
 
 
6. Robustness Tests 
In this section, I perform two tests of the robustness of the loan effect.  First, I 
examine the robustness of the tax-sensitivity variable, TAXSENS, to stricter definitions of 
sensitivity to dividend taxation.  Second, I examine how the results change when a 
measure of lender negotiating power is included in the model. 
In the first robustness check, I exclude lenders whose sensitivity to taxation is 
difficult to identify, and retain those that are clearly tax-sensitive or tax-neutral.  In Table 
4, TAXSENS is set equal to one when lender j is a retail brokerage firm or a mutual fund 
and set equal to zero when lender j is a broker/dealer, banking institution, pension, 
endowment or hedge fund.  However, as noted in Desai and Jin (2009), the tax-sensitivity 
of each of these types of institutions is sometimes unclear.  This is particularly true for 
broker/dealers that manage the assets of high-net worth individuals, who are likely to be 
tax-sensitive, and the assets of all types of institutions, which vary in their tax-sensitivity.    
For this test, I reset TAXSENS to one if lender j is a retail brokerage firm or a mutual 
fund, which are both clearly tax-sensitive, and set TAXSENS  equal to zero when lender j 
is banking institution, pension, or endowment, which are clearly tax-neutral.   Four 
lenders that are broker/dealers are excluded from the analysis. 
The results of this robustness check, which are presented in Table 8, are similar to 
the main results.  Around the dividend record date, lending fees for tax-sensitive lenders 
are much higher than those of tax-neutral lenders, and loan quantities for tax-sensitive 
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lenders are significantly less than those of tax-neutral lenders.  Specifically, the 
coefficient on the event days for tax-sensitive lenders is strongly positive for lending fees 
(  = 0.032, t = 8.88) and strongly negative for loan quantities (  = -0.12, t = -6.00).  
These findings suggest that the loan effect is robust to stricter definitions of tax-
sensitivity. 
In the second robustness check, I include a measure of the lender’s negotiating 
power.  Duffie et al. (2002) predict that the lending fees charged by a given lender are 
increasing in the lender’s bargaining power (proposition 5, p. 321).  Following Cohen et 
al. (2007), I create the indicator variable, POWER, which is set to one when the ratio of 
non-event period loan quantity (QTY) to the prior month’s short interest is in the top 
quartile of the sample.  Since the stock lending market is incomplete and subject to search 
frictions, it is likely that the shift in the supply curve would be larger when the shares of a 
particular stock are mostly held by a tax-sensitive lender.  Thus, I predict that the increase 
in lending fees is larger when the lender has significant negotiating power.  I test this 
prediction by augmenting equation (5) with POWER and interacting POWER with 
TAXSENS*EVENT.   
The results of the second robustness check support the prediction in Duffie et al. 
(2002)—lending fees around the dividend record date are positively associated with the 
negotiating power.  In Table 9, for tax-sensitive lenders that lend a large portion of the 
total short interest, the coefficient on EVENT*POWER*TAXSENS is positive and 
significant (  = 0.014, t = 2.04).   Thus, the effect of dividend taxation on lending fees is 
even larger when the lender holds significant negotiating power in setting lending fees. 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper presents empirical evidence on the effects of dividend taxation on 
short sellers.  I employ a proprietary dataset of stock lending fees by multiple equity 
lenders who vary in their sensitivity to taxation.  The findings suggest that variation in 
tax-sensitivity is positively associated with variation in lending fees and negatively 
associated with loan quantities. In addition, I consider the effects of dividend 
reimbursement, in which short sellers must reimburse the full amount of the dividend to 
the lender for short positions held open over the dividend record date.  However, the 
price drop is on average incomplete, which some researchers have attributed to taxation.  
I predict and find evidence that short selling is delayed to avoid this incremental cost of 
short selling. 
Thus, the empirical evidence presented here suggests that short selling is affected 
by two tax effects: the loan effect and the reimbursement effect.  The preponderance of 
evidence in prior literature suggests that short sellers are informed investors who are 
important to the market.  Short selling makes markets more efficient by preventing 
overpricing and asset bubbles and make prices more efficient by incorporating negative 
news into asset prices.  To the extent that taxation increases short sales constraints, stock 
prices can become less efficient.   
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection  
Quarterly dividend observations with available short volume, availability and 
lending fees         7,871  
Less observations with the following criteria: 
 
Time between cum-date and record date greater than three days          (600) 
Missing Price-Drop Ratio (PDR)          (169) 
Missing lagged Price-Drop Ratio (REIMBCOST)          (239) 
Missing control variables (SIZE, MB, IO, NANALYST, TURNOVER, NASDAQ,  
OPTION)          (325) 
Full sample of record date observations         6,538  
  
Subset that identifies the lender of the stock loan         6,538  
Less observations with the following criteria: 
 
Less than 10 lender observations during the event period       (1,639) 
Trade quantity less than 20,000 shares          (653) 
Sub-sample of record date observations with lender identification         4,246  
 
The sample is composed of quarterly dividend distributions of common stocks from the CRSP distribution 
files.  These observations are matched to return and volume observations from the CRSP daily files and 
short sales volume collected from TAQ (NYSE) and from the exchange websites (AMEX and NASDAQ).  
These data are combined with a proprietary dataset that includes shares available for stock loans and short 
lending fees.  The control variables, which are defined in Table 2, are from COMPUSTAT (MB), CRSP 
(SIZE, MB, TURNOVER), I/B/E/S (NANALYST), OptionMetrics (OPTION) and Thompson Financial (IO).  
The full sample consists of 6,538 dividend record date observations for 1,265 unique firms.  The subsample 
covers 4,246 ex-dividend dates for 950 unique firms across nine lenders, two of which are tax-sensitive.  
The sample period begins in January 2005 and runs through May 2007, during which the SEC Regulation 
SHO required stock exchanges to publicly disclose daily short volume data. 
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TABLE 2 
 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Short Selling Variables 
     Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Skew. P25 P75 
RELSS   6,538  0.21 0.21 0.06 0.34 0.17 0.25 
SPECIAL   6,538  0.36 0.13 0.78 3.96 0.01 0.38 
AVAIL   6,538  0.10 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.13 
        
        Panel B: Firm-Level Variables 
     Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Skew. P25 P75 
PDR   6,538  0.66 0.79 5.97 -0.02 -1.17 2.52 
REIMBCOST   6,538  0.54 1.00 0.50 -0.17 0.00 1.00 
DIV   6,538  0.21 0.16 0.17 1.38 0.08 0.29 
SIZE   6,538  21.98 21.80 1.47 0.45 20.87 23.05 
MB   6,538  3.09 2.32 2.70 3.59 1.67 3.53 
IO   6,538  0.65 0.68 0.25 -0.65 0.48 0.84 
NANALYST   6,538  9.85 8.08 7.34 0.89 3.92 14.42 
TURNOVER   6,538  0.01 0.01 0.01 2.01 0.00 0.01 
OPTION   6,538  0.62 1.00 0.49 -0.48 0.00 1.00 
NASDAQ   6,538  0.20 0.00 0.40 1.47 0.00 0.00 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Panel C: Correlation Matrix (Spearman above/Pearson below) 
 
R
E
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S
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P
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E
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M
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N
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N
A
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S
T
 
T
U
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O
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O
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T
IO
N
 
N
A
S
D
A
Q
 
RELSS 
 
0.19 -0.21 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.39 -0.11 -0.01 -0.27 0.09 -0.14 0.07 
SPECIAL 0.09 
 
-0.17 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.39 -0.10 0.03 -0.32 0.15 -0.23 0.17 
AVAIL -0.20 -0.29 
 
-0.02 0.02 -0.13 0.20 0.05 0.52 0.16 0.25 0.12 -0.11 
PDR 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 
0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 
REIMBCOST 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 
 
0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 
DIV -0.02 0.02 -0.12 0.03 -0.01 
 
0.25 -0.04 -0.20 -0.03 -0.27 -0.03 -0.21 
SIZE -0.40 -0.31 0.18 0.03 -0.02 0.22 
 
0.29 -0.01 0.75 -0.08 0.39 -0.32 
MB -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.16 
 
-0.03 0.20 0.00 0.16 0.05 
IO -0.03 -0.11 0.51 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.03 0.03 
 
0.02 0.55 0.14 -0.13 
NANALYST -0.28 -0.24 0.15 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.75 0.09 0.05 
 
0.06 0.37 -0.10 
TURNOVER 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.00 -0.02 -0.20 -0.11 0.02 0.37 0.06 
 
0.16 -0.01 
OPTION -0.13 -0.17 0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.36 0.11 0.17 0.32 0.11 
 
-0.19 
NASDAQ 0.07 0.15 -0.11 -0.01 0.02 -0.20 -0.30 0.02 -0.13 -0.09 0.03 -0.19 
  
This table presents descriptive statistics for short selling variables (Panel A) and firm-level variables (Panel B), 
as well as  pair-wise correlations among the variables (Panel C).  The short selling variables in panel A are all 
measured during the estimation period, t = [-15, -5]∪[5, 15] relative to the dividend record date, t = 0.   RELSS is 
the mean daily relative short volume, measured as the ratio of total short selling volume to total trading volume.  
SPECIAL is the daily stock loan fee for a short sale, measured as the daily federal funds rates less the value-
weighted loan rebate rate.  AVAIL is the ratio of shares available for stock loans to total shares outstanding.  
PDR is the price-drop to dividend ratio, measured as the cum-dividend day stock price less the ex-dividend day 
stock price, all divided by the split-adjusted dividend amount, DIV.  The rest of the variables are measured for a 
given firm in the prior quarter. REIMBCOST is an indicator variable equal to one if the prior quarter PDR is less 
than one and zero otherwise. SIZE is the natural log of lagged market capitalization, MB is market capitalization 
divided by total common equity, IO is total institutional holdings scaled by shares outstanding, NANALYST is 
the average number of analysts following the firm, and TURNOVER is the mean daily trading volume in the 
prior quarter divided by shares outstanding.  OPTION is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has listed 
options and zero otherwise and NASDAQ is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is traded on the 
Nasdaq, and zero otherwise.  
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TABLE 3 
 Event Study of Lending Fees and Shares Available around the Dividend Record 
Date 
 
Short Lending Fees (SPECIAL) 
 
Shares Available (AVAIL) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
  
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
Coef. t-stat 
 
Coef. t-stat 
  
Coef. t-stat 
 
Coef. t-stat 
 INTERCEPT -0.003 -15.23 *** 0.400 8.06 *** 
 
0.126 78.78 *** -0.083 -5.20 *** 
EVENT 0.036 21.08 *** 0.032 19.11 *** 
 
-0.004 -21.60 *** -0.004 -21.70 *** 
DIV 
  
  0.063 3.12 *** 
   
  -0.024 -5.26 *** 
SIZE 
  
  -0.017 -7.12 *** 
   
  0.006 7.28 *** 
MB 
  
  0.000 -1.03   
   
  0.000 -0.72   
IO 
  
  0.013 1.50   
   
  0.139 40.43 *** 
NANALYST 
  
  -0.001 -2.46 ** 
   
  0.000 -0.08   
TURNOVER 
  
  3.972 10.31 *** 
   
  -1.601 -10.73 *** 
NASDAQ 
  
  0.020 3.30 *** 
   
  0.001 0.32   
OPTION 
  
  -0.039 -8.28 *** 
   
  -0.003 -1.85 * 
N 80,507  
 
80,527  
  
134,600  
 
133,689  
 
Adj. R2 0.029 
 
0.116 
  
0.079 
 
0.528 
  
This table presents the results of estimating the equation (4): 
 
 
, 
 
where TESTVAR is either SPECIAL or AVAIL.  Models (1) and (2) present the event study results for 
SPECIAL and models (3) and (4) present the event study results for AVAIL. SPECIAL is the stock loan rate 
for firm i for a short sale on day t and AVAIL is the number shares available for stock loans of firm i on day 
t divided total shares outstanding.  The event date, date t = 0, is the dividend record date.  Since settlement 
takes place three days following a transaction, stock lending on the dividend record date corresponds to 
cum-date short selling.  The indicator variable, EVENT, is set to one on days t = [-1, 0] and zero during the 
estimation period, t = [-15, -5]∪[5, 15]; all observations in the event period, t = [-5, +5], are set to missing.   
The regression includes control variables as defined in Table 2, year-quarter and industry fixed effects 
(unreported) and White standard errors clustered by firm.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 4 
Analysis of Effect of Tax-Sensitive Stock Lending on 
Loan Fees and Quantities around the Dividend Record Date  
 
Short Lending Fees (SPECIAL) 
 
Shares on Loan (QTY) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
  
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
Coef. t-stat 
 
Coef. t-stat 
  
Coef. t-stat 
 
Coef. t-stat 
 INTERCEPT -0.061 -13.87 *** 0.047 1.77 * 
 
0.505 0.15   2.578 13.45 *** 
EVENT 0.010 10.63 *** 0.010 10.43 *** 
 
0.000 -0.07   -0.006 -1.13   
TAXSENS 0.032 20.61 *** 0.030 18.99 *** 
 
-0.074 -5.31 *** -0.060 -4.61 *** 
EVENT*TAXSENS 0.009 3.09 *** 0.010 3.21 *** 
 
-0.127 -7.36 *** -0.092 -5.81 *** 
DIV 
  
  0.031 4.01 *** 
   
  0.165 3.03 *** 
SIZE 
  
  -0.005 -4.07 *** 
   
  -0.103 -11.53 *** 
MB 
  
  0.000 1.90 * 
   
  0.000 -1.96 * 
IO 
  
  -0.006 -1.07   
   
  0.392 10.66 *** 
NANALYST 
  
  0.000 1.32   
   
  -0.002 -1.14   
TURNOVER 
  
  1.257 6.11 *** 
   
  6.829 4.04 *** 
NASDAQ 
  
  0.001 0.36   
   
  0.048 1.96 * 
OPTION 
  
  -0.008 -3.05 *** 
   
  -0.024 -1.33   
N 55,189  
 
55,225  
  
54,577  
 
54,608  
 Adj. R2 0.082 
 
0.101 
  
0.081 
 
0.234 
  
This table presents the results of estimating the equation (5): 
 
 
, 
 
where TESTVAR is either SPECIAL or QTY.  Models (1) and (2) present the event study results for 
SPECIAL and models (3) and (4) present the event study results for QTY.  SPECIAL is the stock loan rate 
charged by lender j for a short sale on stock i on day t.  QTY is the number of shares of stock i loaned by 
lender j on day t scaled by total shares outstanding.   TAXSENS is an indicator variable equal to one if 
lender j is sensitive to taxation on substitute dividends and equal to zero otherwise.  Tax-sensitive lenders 
include a retail brokerage house and a mutual fund, while tax-neutral lenders include pension funds, 
endowments and others who cannot be classified as either tax-sensitive or tax-insensitive.  The event date, 
date t = 0, is the dividend record date.  Since settlement takes place three days following a transaction, 
stock lending on the dividend record date corresponds to cum-date short selling.  The indicator variable, 
EVENT, is set to one on days t = [-1, 0] and zero during the estimation period, t = [-15, -5]∪[5, 15]; all 
observations in the event period, t = [-5, +5], are set to missing.   The regression includes control variables 
as defined in Table 2, year-quarter and industry fixed effects (unreported) and White standard errors 
clustered by firm.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  The 
sample used in this table is a subset of the full sample that identifies the actual loan fee and quantities 
charged by nine different equity lenders.  The sample covers 4,246 ex-dividend dates for 950 firms across 
nine lenders, two of which are tax-sensitive. 
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TABLE 5 
Analysis of Abnormal Short Volume around the Cum-Dividend Day 
 
Event Days t = [-2, 0] 
 
Event Days t = [1, 3] 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
  
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
Coef. t-stat 
 
Coef. t-stat 
  
Coef. t-stat 
 
Coef. t-stat 
 INTERCEPT 20.256 41.33 *** 62.543 27.59 *** 
 
20.205 28.87 *** 62.353 27.70 *** 
EVENT -0.336 -5.73 *** -0.352 -5.99 *** 
 
0.201 3.49 *** 0.226 3.94 *** 
DIV 
  
  2.564 4.69 *** 
   
  2.570 4.73 *** 
SIZE 
  
  -1.901 -17.53 *** 
   
  -1.897 -17.61 *** 
MB 
  
  0.005 1.66 * 
   
  0.005 1.68 * 
IO 
  
  -0.128 -0.34   
   
  -0.139 -0.37   
NANALYST 
  
  0.081 3.83 *** 
   
  0.081 3.86 *** 
TURNOVER 
  
  13.745 1.68 * 
   
  14.948 1.79 * 
NASDAQ 
  
  -1.030 -3.91 *** 
   
  -1.022 -3.90 *** 
OPTION 
  
  0.415 2.10 ** 
   
  0.413 2.10 ** 
N 156,752  
 
156,911  
  
156,761  
 
156,863  
 Adj. R2 0.021 
 
0.088 
  
0.021 
 
0.088 
  
This table presents the result of estimating the equation (6): 
 
 
, 
 
where RELSS is the ratio of short volume to total volume, measured as a percentage.  The event date, date t 
= 0, is the cum-dividend date (i.e., the last day the stock trades with the dividend).  The indicator variable, 
EVENT, is equal to one on days t = [-2, 0] for models (1) and (2) and days t = [1, 3] for models (3) and (4), 
and equal to zero during the estimation period, t = [-15, -5]∪[5, 15].   All other observations in the event 
period, t = [-5, +5], are set to missing.   The regression includes control variables as defined in Table 2, 
year-quarter and industry fixed effects and White standard errors clustered by firm.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Effect of Dividend Reimbursement Cost on Short Volume around the Cum-
Dividend Day 
 
Event Days t = [-2, 0] 
  
Event Days t = [1, 3] 
 
 
Coef. t-stat 
  
Coef. t-stat 
 INTERCEPT 62.487 27.61 *** 
 
62.383 27.63 *** 
EVENT -0.290 -3.49 *** 
 
0.154 1.80 * 
REIMBCOST 0.049 0.46   
 
0.005 0.04   
EVENT*REIMBCOST -0.223 -1.97 ** 
 
0.135 1.15   
DIV 2.566 4.70 *** 
 
2.568 4.72 *** 
SIZE -1.900 -17.57 *** 
 
-1.898 -17.60 *** 
MB 0.005 1.67 * 
 
0.005 1.68 * 
IO -0.133 -0.36   
 
-0.137 -0.37   
NANALYST 0.081 3.84 *** 
 
0.081 3.86 *** 
TURNOVER 14.273 1.73 * 
 
14.637 1.77 * 
NASDAQ -1.028 -3.91 *** 
 
-1.024 -3.91 *** 
OPTION 0.415 2.10 ** 
 
0.414 2.10 ** 
N 156,889  
  
156,875  
 
Adj. R2 0.088     0.088   
F-test ) = 0] 
 
13.04 
   
7.12 
  p-value 0.000 *** 
  
0.008 *** 
  
This table presents the result of estimating the equation (7): 
 
 
 , 
 
where RELSS is the ratio of short volume to total volume, measured as a percentage and REIMBCOST is an 
indicator variable set to one when the lagged Price-Drop to Dividend ratio (PDRt-1) is less than one, and 
zero otherwise.  The event date, date t = 0, is the cum-dividend date (i.e., the last day the stock trades with 
the dividend).  The indicator variable, EVENT, is equal to one on days t = [-2, 0] for the left column and 
days t = [1, 3] for the right column specification, and equal to zero during the estimation period, t = [-15, -
5]∪[5, 15].   All other observations in the event period, t = [-5, +5], are set to missing.   The regression 
includes control variables as defined in Table 2, year-quarter and industry fixed effects and White standard 
errors that are clustered by firm.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Effect of Dividends on Short Volume around the Cum-Dividend Day 
 
Event Days t = [-2, 0] 
  
Event Days t = [1, 3] 
 
 
Coef. t-stat 
  
Coef. t-stat 
 INTERCEPT 61.803 27.14 *** 
 
61.819 27.06 *** 
EVENT -0.340 -5.03 *** 
 
0.230 3.49 *** 
HIDIV 0.788 3.52 *** 
 
0.755 3.32 *** 
EVENT*HIDIV -0.276 -2.16 ** 
 
-0.018 -0.14   
SIZE -1.835 -17.11 *** 
 
-1.838 -17.09 *** 
MB 0.005 1.72 * 
 
0.005 1.71 * 
IO -0.372 -1.01   
 
-0.361 -0.97   
NANALYST 0.071 3.38 *** 
 
0.071 3.38 *** 
TURNOVER 18.723 2.09 ** 
 
17.156 1.95 * 
NASDAQ -1.082 -4.16 *** 
 
-1.085 -4.15 *** 
OPTION 0.377 1.92 * 
 
0.378 1.93 * 
N 156,837  
  
156,855  
 
Adj. R2 0.087     0.087   
F-test ) = 0] 14.92 
   
0.55 
  p-value 0.000 *** 
  
0.459 
   
This table presents the result of estimating the equation (7): 
 
 
, 
 
where RELSS is the ratio of short volume to total volume, measured as a percentage and HIDIV is an 
indicator set to one if the event’s split-adjusted dividend amount is in the highest quartile of dividends for 
the sample.  The event date, date t = 0, is the cum-dividend date (i.e., the last day the stock trades with the 
dividend).  The indicator variable, EVENT, is equal to one on days t = [-2, 0] for the left column and days t 
= [1, 3] for the right column, and equal to zero during the estimation period, t = [-15, -5]∪[5, 15].   All other 
observations in the event period, t = [-5, +5], are set to missing.   The regression includes control variables 
as defined in Table 2, year-quarter and industry fixed effects and White standard errors that are clustered by 
firm.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
 Robustness Test of TAXSENS variable 
 
Short Lending Fees (SPECIAL) 
 
Shares on Loan (QTY) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
  
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
Coef. t-stat 
 
Coef. t-stat 
  
Coef. t-stat 
 
Coef. t-stat 
 INTERCEPT -0.073 -20.96 *** -0.052 -1.80 * 
 
0.435 0.18   4.582 18.10 *** 
EVENT -0.010 -4.12 *** -0.010 -4.24 *** 
 
0.109 5.99 *** 0.059 4.12 *** 
TAXSENS 0.020 8.60 *** 0.020 8.69 *** 
 
0.171 8.35 *** 0.171 10.40 *** 
EVENT*TAXSENS 0.032 9.06 *** 0.032 8.88 *** 
 
-0.235 -9.60 *** -0.120 -6.00 *** 
DIV 
  
  0.010 1.45   
   
  0.117 1.78 * 
SIZE 
  
  -0.001 -0.46   
   
  -0.185 -14.78 *** 
MB 
  
  0.000 0.72   
   
  0.000 -3.14 *** 
IO 
  
  -0.008 -1.75 * 
   
  0.250 5.71 *** 
NANALYST 
  
  0.000 -0.27   
   
  -0.003 -1.15   
TURNOVER 
  
  0.071 0.40   
   
  3.566 1.88 * 
NASDAQ 
  
  -0.002 -0.68   
   
  0.014 0.47   
OPTION 
  
  0.000 0.09   
   
  -0.034 -1.60   
N 14,607  
 
14,611  
  
14,507  
 
14,380  
 Adj. R2 0.081 
 
0.083 
  
0.089 
 
0.368 
  
In this table, I create an alternate measure of TAXSENS that includes only stock lenders that are clearly tax-
sensitive or tax-neutral with regard to substitute dividends.  In this table, TAXSENS is an indicator variable 
equal to one if lender j is sensitive to taxation on substitute dividends and equal to zero otherwise.  Tax-
sensitive lenders include a retail brokerage house and a mutual fund, while tax-neutral lenders include 
pension funds, endowments and institutional owners.  Lenders that are broker-dealers are excluded from 
the analysis.  I estimate the following regression using the alternate measure of TAXSENS: 
 
 
, 
 
where SPECIAL is the stock loan rate charged by lender j for a short sale on stock i on day t.  The event 
date, date t = 0, is the dividend record date.  Since settlement takes place three days following a transaction, 
stock lending on the dividend record date corresponds to cum-date short selling.  The indicator variable, 
EVENT, is set to one on days t = [-1, 0] and zero during the estimation period, t= [-15, -5]∪[5, 15]; all 
observations in the event period, t = [-5, +5], are set to missing.   The regression includes control variables 
as defined in Table 1, year-quarter and industry fixed effects (unreported) and White standard errors that 
are clustered by firm.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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TABLE 9 
 Robustness Test: Tests of Lender Negotiating Power 
DEPVAR: SPECIALit (1) 
  
(2) 
 
 
Coef. t-stat 
  
    
 INTERCEPT 0.087 3.07 *** 
 
0.067 2.43 ** 
EVENT 0.001 0.80   
 
0.006 6.27 *** 
POWER 0.005 5.44 *** 
 
0.010 4.40 *** 
EVENT*POWER 0.004 6.09 *** 
 
0.008 4.10 *** 
TAXSENS 
    
0.028 17.34 *** 
EVENT*TAXSENS 
    
0.008 2.37 ** 
POWER*TAXSENS 
    
0.002 0.73   
EVENT*POWER*TAXSENS 
   
0.014 2.04 ** 
DIV 0.034 4.23 *** 
 
0.031 4.04 *** 
SIZE -0.007 -4.95 *** 
 
-0.006 -4.59 *** 
MB 0.000 1.55   
 
0.000 1.16   
IO -0.005 -0.99   
 
-0.006 -1.13   
NANALYST 0.000 1.29   
 
0.000 1.24   
TURNOVER 1.660 7.54 *** 
 
1.376 6.54 *** 
NASDAQ 0.003 0.83   
 
0.003 0.79   
OPTION -0.010 -3.64 *** 
 
-0.008 -3.11 *** 
N 75,675  
  
75,940  
 
Adj. R2 0.079     0.101   
 
In this table, I examine the effect of dividend taxation on lending activity based on the lender’s ability to 
negotiate lending fees.  Following Cohen et al. (2007), I create an indicator variable, POWER, that is set to 
one when ratio of the mean estimation period loan quantity to the lagged short interest of lender j for stock i 
during event t is in the highest quartile of the sample.  The dependent variable is SPECIAL, which is the 
stock loan rate charged by lender j for a short sale on stock i on day t.  The independent variables are 
defined as follows. TAXSENS is an indicator variable equal to one if lender j is sensitive to taxation on 
substitute dividends and equal to zero otherwise.  Tax-sensitive lenders include a retail brokerage house 
and a mutual fund, while tax-neutral lenders include pension funds, endowments and others who cannot be 
classified as either tax-sensitive or tax-insensitive.  The event date, date t = 0, is the dividend record date.  
Since settlement takes place three days following a transaction, stock lending on the dividend record date 
corresponds to cum-date short selling.  The indicator variable, EVENT, is set to one on days t = [-1, 0] and 
zero during the estimation period, t= [-15, -5]∪[5, 15]; all observations in the event period, t = [-5, +5], are 
set to missing.   The regression includes control variables as defined in Table 2, year-quarter and industry 
fixed effects (unreported) and White standard errors that are clustered by firm.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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FIGURE 1 
Abnormal Short Lending Fees Around the Dividend Record Date 
 
 
 
This figure plots the coefficient estimates for event-time indicator variables from a regression of short 
lending fees, SPECIAL, on indicator variables for each day relative to the dividend record date and control 
variables as follows: 
 
 . 
The coefficient estimates, , represent abnormal short lending fees relative to other days in the sample 
period, which covers days t = [-15, 15] relative to the record date, t = 0.  The top panel includes the full 
sample, while the bottom panel splits the sample based on tax-sensitivity.  All control variables are defined 
in Table 2.  The estimation includes year-quarter and industry fixed effects and White standard errors 
clustered by firm.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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FIGURE 2 
Abnormal Short Volume Around the Cum-Dividend Date 
 
 
 
This figure plots the coefficient estimates from a regression of relative short volume, RELSS, on indicator 
variables for each day relative to the cum-dividend date and control variables as follows: 
  
    
The coefficient estimates, , represent abnormal short volume relative to other days in the sample period, 
which covers days t = [-15, 15] relative to the cum-dividend date, t = 0.  The top panel includes the full 
sample, while the bottom panel splits the sample based on REIMBCOST.  REIMBCOST is an indicator 
variable set to one when the lagged Price-Drop to Dividend ratio (PDRt-1) is less than one and zero 
otherwise. All control variables are defined in Table 2.  The estimation includes year-quarter and industry 
fixed effects and White standard errors clustered by firm.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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